Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Long before the days of moonshine and speakeasies, commerce in intoxicating liquors was subject to extensive regulation. With the demise of the Prohibition era, authority over the production, distribution, and consumption of liquor was returned to the states.' At the core of this regulatory authority is section two of the twenty-first amendment, which prohibits the importation of liquor into any state "in violation of the laws thereof." '2 Many states, interpreting section two broadly, have enacted statutes intended to minimize the prices distillers may charge distributors. These statutes require producers to provide state liquor control agencies with schedules of the prices they intend to charge during each sales period. 3 These statutes commonly require distillers to file "price affirmations," or guarantees, concerning prices. "Affirmation statutes" require producers to guarantee that the price filed for each item will be at least as low as the price charged for that item anywhere else in the country during the same specified period. The affirmation may be prospective, meaning that the affirmation applies to prices charged concurrently in other states. 4 Or, it may be retrospective, linking the affirmed prices to the prices charged elsewhere the previous month. 5 The enunciated purpose of these statutes is to secure the benefits of competition in other states for intrastate consumers. 6 These statutes clearly fall within the ambit of state authority under the twenty-first amendment. However, such a reading seems to violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, which forbids any state from regulating commerce taking place beyond its borders. 7 Reading the two constitutional provisions together, the twenty-first amendment permits the states to prohibit the importation 8 of alcohol if they so desire, 9 but the commerce clause seems to forbid the extension of the reach of their alcohol regulations into other states' territories. Affirmation statutes extend the states' regulation in this manner.
The concurrent operation of many states' affirmation provisions is the primary cause of these extraterritorial effects. Within the network of statutes, producers are virtually unable to change any price in one state without multistate regulatory approval. Each affirmation statute requires each producer to certify that its prices are at most equal to the lowest available in any other state. Additionally, prices once scheduled are usually alterable only with regulatory approval. 1° A distiller who decides to raise a price in one state must raise the price everywhere else during the relevant statutory period or risk sanctions, usually fines and loss of license. On the other hand, a distiller who wishes to reduce prices in a given state will be forced to cut them in other states at some point 1 or risk censure under the other states'
provisions. 12 The Supreme Court first considered the validity of liquor price affirmation statutes under the dormant commerce clause in 1966. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 1 3 the Court considered the pioneering retrospective statute then in effect in New York. After the Court declined to hold this statute unconstitutional, the affirmation issue disappeared from the bench for nearly two decades.
In the years after Seagram, many more states adopted the affirmation approach to wholesale liquor price control. Today there exists a virtually "national system of liquor regulation" in this area, 14 with upward pressure on prices caused by New York's mandatory minimum price maintenance statute). 7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also notes 91-95 infra and accompanying text (discussing the dormant commerce clause).
8. The terms "importation," "domestic," and "extraterritorial," as used generally in this Note, relate to state borders rather than international frontiers.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 10. These statutes typically permit changes to the schedule only "for good cause shown." See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 138, § 25B(d) (1984) October 1987] thirty-nine states having some form of affirmation statute.' 5 As the practical effects of this network become more onerous, the issue of these statutes' constitutionality has reemerged. The issue returned to the Supreme Court in 1983, when the Court affirmed without opinion a Second Circuit decision' 6 holding unconstitutional Connecticut's prospective affirmation statute.' 7 Then, in 1986, the Court rejected New York's prospective affirmation statute in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority. ' 8 In this action, BrownForman challenged the prospective affirmation statute that succeeded the retrospective statute upheld in Seagram. ' 9 The Court concluded that the law violated the commerce clause because it "directly regulated commerce [in other states]." '20 While the Supreme Court has thus far found only prospective statutes unconstitutional, 2 ' this Note argues that all liquor price affirmation statutes violate the commerce clause. The Constitution does not recognize a distinction between retrospective and prospective affirmation statutes. All affirmation statutes place an impermissible burden upon interstate commerce and represent an unconstitutional extraterritorial exercise of state legislative power. Although section two of the twenty-first amendment grants to the states unconstrained authority to control all aspects of traffic in alcoholic beverages within their respective borders, it does not give the states carte blanche to set liquor prices beyond those borders. Therefore, the twenty-first amendment does not rescue affirmation statutes from a commerce clause violation.
Part I of this Note examines the current state of the law in the liquor affirmation area. Part II argues that the twenty-first amendment may not be invoked to justify the extraterritorial impact of these statutes. The amendment does not preempt the commerce clause in 16. United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 464 U.S. 909 (1983), affg. 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982). This decision, invalidating a prospective affirmation statute on commerce clause grounds, was arguably too fact-specific to be itself dispositive on the prospective statute issue. The Connecticut statute dealt with beer rather than distilled spirits and linked Connecticut prices only with the prices charged in the three adjacent states. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b(b)
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A. The Operation of Affirmation Statutes
Thirty-nine states have some form of maximum liquor price regulation. 22 Of this number, eighteen are so-called "control states" where the state contracts directly with the producers. Such regulations result in state control of virtually all aspects of the liquor industry. 23 These states, in their contracts with producers, often employ a standard provision called the "Des Moines Warranty" which requires distillers and brewers to guarantee that they will charge the lowest prices quoted anywhere else within the United States. 24 Twenty-one other states, called "affirmation states," '2 5 permit producers to set the prices in accordance with particular regulatory provisions. 28 provide that every producer selling within the state must append an affirmation to its price schedule. This document affirms that each price quoted is the lowest price that will be available anywhere in the United States during the month the schedule will be in effect. 29 Retrospective affirmation statutes, in contrast, link each item's scheduled price to the minimum price available anywhere during the previous month. 30 In other words, while both kinds of statutes require the producer to swear to provide the lowest prices, only prospective statutes fix those prices to out-of-state prices during the effective month. Retrospective statutes require that the filed prices will be no higher than the lowest price charged during the previous month. 33 This retrospective statute required producers to file monthly price schedules with the State Liquor Authority accompanied by an affirmation that the scheduled bottle and case prices were no higher than the lowest wholesale prices obtainable elsewhere in the United States during the preceding month.
34
CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(a) (McKinney 1987) (the statute the Supreme Court struck down in Brown-Fornan only permitted mid-month price changes as a matter of discretion of the State Liquor Authority "for good cause shown"). A simultaneous statute may impose an even looser regime; instead of requiring a schedule to be filed, the statute may merely insist upon an affirmation that the prices charged at any moment are at that moment equal to or less than the lowest available. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (declared unconstitutional by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina) (producer not required to file a price list or to obtain permission from the South Carolina Alcohol Beverage Control Commission prior to changing prices). As long as the producer selling in South Carolina keeps its prices as low as the lowest price charged anywhere else, the producer remains in compliance with the statute. Brown-Forman, 643 F. Supp. at 947. Under a current statute, purchasers are assured that they are paying the lowest price available at the instant of purchase rather than at any other arbitrarily selected comparison point. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 3 n. (0), and (k) of the 1964 version were not altered when § 101-b(3)(a) was made prospective. Today § 101-b-3(f) prohibits sales to wholesalers and retailers of brands for which no affirmation has been filed. Section 101-b-3(g) requires the "lowest price" to reflect all discounts and other allowances to wholesalers and retailers available anywhere, with the excep-In Seagram, wholesalers and importers brought suit against New York officials for injunctive and declaratory relief 35 that would prohibit enforcement of the new provision. 36 As the statute was not yet in force, the Court was concerned only with the question of whether the statute violated the commerce clause on its face. 37 In upholding the statute, the Court concluded that "the mere fact that [it] is geared to appellants' pricing policies in other States is not sufficient to invalidate the statute. As part of its regulatory scheme ... New York may constitutionally insist that liquor prices to domestic wholesalers and retailers be as low as prices offered elsewhere in the country. ' 38 Although the Court was aware that several prospective statutes and some control states' warranty provisions were already in place, 39 it found that the New York statute on its face created no unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 40 44 a 1935 dormant commerce clause case dealing with New York milk prices. In Seelig, the Court held unconstitutional a New York milk pricing provision requiring out-of-state suppliers to adhere to a price floor equivalent to the in-state minimum price. 45 The Court held this statute to be discriminatory in both purpose and effect. 46 Looking tion of state sales taxes and delivery costs. Section 101-b-3(h) and (i) provide for criminal penalties for the filing of false affirmations. to the impact on interstate commerce, the Court found that "[t]he substance of the provision is that.., there shall be no sale within the state of milk bought outside unless the price paid to the producers was one that would be lawful upon a like transaction within the state." '4 7 By contrast, the Court in the Seagram declaratory judgment action found Seagram unable to introduce any evidence showing that the affirmation statute, once in force, would affect prices elsewhere.
As a result of the series of stays granted throughout the pendency of the
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1983: Healy Rejects Connecticut's Prospective Statute
In Healy v. United States Brewers Association, 4 9 the Court summarily affirmed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding unconstitutional the prospective beer affirmation provisions of the Connecticut Liquor Control Act. 50 These provisions required brewers to affirm that the beer prices they filed would be at least as low as the prices charged in states bordering Connecticut.
51
The district court had granted summary judgment against the brewers, citing Seagram for the proposition that affirmation statutes place no undue burden upon interstate commerce. 52 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the lower court's conclusion that the statute attempted only to equalize, rather than to favor, the competitive position of Connecticut beer dealers.
3
The Second Circuit in Healy based its decision on general dormant commerce clause principles. It began its analysis with a restatement of the Seelig proposition that the commerce clause is intended to promote free trade and "liberate the flow of ... commerce from the provincialism evident in many local regulations." '54 The court then considered the balancing process used by the Supreme Court to determine the validity of a state regulation in light of its intended benefits and its detriment to interstate commerce. 5 5 The court determined that the burdens of a state regulation on commerce are impermissible if the regulation's purpose or effect is to control activity taking place entirely outside the state. In assessing the out-of-state effects, it is the practical consequences that are relevant. Finally, the court found that the Supreme Court's construction of the twenty-first amendment makes it 47 an insufficient basis upon which to permit state regulation of the liquor traffic outside each respective state's own territory.
Applying these principles to the Connecticut statute, 56 the court held simply that the beer affirmation provisions were facially invalid under the commerce clause. 57 This violation occurred because the "obvious effect" of the law, the setting of a minimum price in the three states bordering Connecticut, was "to control the minimum price that may be charged by a non-Connecticut brewer to a non-Connecticut wholesaler in a sale outside of Connecticut. ' 58 The Healy court relied on the retrospective-prospective distinction in refusing to follow the Seagram precedent.
59
While the Healy case marshals all of the relevant commerce clause and twenty-first amendment principles, the Second Circuit's decision was based primarily upon the narrow temporal distinction between retrospective and prospective statutes. The Healy court's clear commerce clause reasoning, however, leads logically to a decision contrary to Seagram. 58. 692 F.2d at 282. 59. 692 F.2d at 282-83. 60. Of course, as a court of appeals decision may not hold contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, Circuit Judge Kearse had to distinguish Seagram rather than declare it obsolete. However, her commerce clause reasoning itself leads more directly to a distinction of Seagram based upon the procedural nature of the action, a suit for declaratory judgment, and the "'practical effects" question, than to a distinction based on the temporal foci of the statute.
If the Healy situation were compared to Seagram, much of the factual distinction would cut the opposite way, supporting the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute. First, the Connecticut statute applied solely to the prices for beer rather than to all alcoholic beverages. CONN 
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT REPEAL THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE LIQUOR REGULATION AREA
The twenty-first amendment does not save affirmation statutes whose effects are felt across state borders. Section two of the twentyfirst amendment reserves to the states the unabridged right to regulate or prohibit altogether the importation and distribution of liquor within their territories. 67 It grants them "virtually complete control over... oversimplification. " 82 The Supreme Court's current interpretation of this muddle places limits on states' actions under section two. "Doubts about the scope of the Amendment's authorization notwithstanding, one thing is certain: The central purpose of the provision was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition. ' 83 Rather than attempt to state authoritatively the purpose of the amendment, "[i]n determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the provision rather than the history behind it. '' 84 Although the words of the amendment by necessity grant regulatory power beyond the minimum required simply to close the state borders to alcohol importation, 8 5 the basic limits of the explicit constitutional grant must be kept in mind.
62.
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B. The Twenty-first Amendment Permits No Extraterritorial Effects of State Liquor Regulation
The twenty-first amendment is limited to exercises of state authority occurring wholly intrastate. The general rule is that a state's exercise of power in the liquor area must fall within the purview of the "core [section two] power" of the twenty-first amendment. 8 
A. Affirmation Statutes Are Subject to Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny
Because the twenty-first amendment provides no special protection for affirmation statutes, these statutes must, survive commerce clause scrutiny to be constitutional. The commerce clause gives rise to two classes of claims. The first genre of actions concerns the positive grant to Congress of the power to enact legislation concerning interstate commerce. The classic example of this power is the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 1 in which the Supreme Court held that the commerce clause prohibited New York from controlling steamboat navigation between New York and New Jersey because such navigation was regulated by existing federal law. In such cases, state and federal enactments conflict directly and are settled in favor of the federal legislation. The second genre of cases, the class to which challenges to affirmation statutes belong, is predicated upon the notion that Congress' inaction in certain areas that are considered to fall within the ambit of interstate commerce is a positive bar to state legislation in those areas.
These cases, employing "dormant commerce clause"analysis, are the progeny of Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 92 That case established that Congress' silence in an area that "admit[s] only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation" does not entitle states to fill the legislative vacuum. 93 The Supreme Court in Brown-Forman recognized that wholly intrastate maximum price regulations are generally constitutional in the absence of any extraterritorial effects. 96 Such purely in-state regulation would be quite acceptable in the case of the alcoholic beverage industry; intrastate liquor "price stability has long been considered to be in the interest of temperance and the prevention of chaos in the liquor traffic." '97 Because of this inherent "public interest," maximum price legislation frequently has been promoted in the liquor industry despite the potential for effects across boundaries. Moreover, in "a variety of cases in areas no more sensitive than that of liquor control," Although every affirmation or warranty statute necessarily includes a provision setting forth a formula for calculating the prices to file, these provisions vary widely. In New York, all promotional allowances offered in other states were treated as discounts from the prices in those states. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3) (McKinney 1987) . To determine the out-ofstate price to "beat," the distiller had to subtract all of these "discounts" from the out-of-state sale price. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(3)(g) (1987) (in determining lowest price, "appropriate reductions shall be made to reflect all discounts ... and all rebates, free goods, allowances and other inducements .... ). This was not always as easily accomplished as stated. Brown-Forman's promotional allowances were not tied to particular products. Rather, they took the form of general compensation for promotional services furnished to maximize sales of its entire product line. Brief for Appellant at 6 n. The promotional allowance problem, which the Supreme Court recognized, Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986), forces a distiller to curtail incentive programs in those states in which promotional discounts are legal to account for their illegality elsewhere. Thus, Brown-Forman was able to argue successfully that it found itself in a pricing dilemma: it could reduce its New York prices by the extent of all allowances elsewhere, thereby charging less in New York than elsewhere and risking loss of license under other states' statutes; or it could discontinue the promotional allowances offered in other states, effectively raising prices in the rest of the country to comply with New York's statute. Brown-Forman argued that the abandonment of promotional allowance programs in other states was the most direct infringement upon interstate commerce. 106 S. Ct. 2086.
While the promotional allowance dilemma added weight to Brown-Forman's argument, the Court's holding in Brown-Forman was not dependent on these facts. Instead the Court invalidated all prospective statutes similar to New York's. In Brown-Forman, the Supreme Court outlined the dormant commerce clause test as developed in recent years. Its reasoning as applied in that case is applicable to all affirmation statutes, whether prospective or retrospective.
1 3 In order to invalidate a statute under the dormant commerce clause, its practical effects must be to burden interstate commerce.' 1 4 "The mere fact that state action may have repercussions beyond state lines is of no judicial significance so long as the action is not within that domain which the Constitution forbids."" 1 5 Therefore, the analysis requires an inquiry into the practical There is no constitutional infirmity in a state regulation requiring that purely in-state transactions be governed by the Commission's pricing schedules. This does not constitute a burden on interstate commerce although the product sold within the state and whose selling price is regulated there, originates outside of the state where it is ultimately sold. But we further hold that even though Louisiana has the power and the right to regulate the price at which milk products are sold within the State of Louisiana, it has no power to project its legislation into Tennessee by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there. Cf Seelig 294 U.S. at 511. effects of a statute, regardless of its stated purpose." 16 If affirmation statutes have practical effects in other states, they are invalid despite their articulated purposes of lowering prices for intrastate consumers.
The Court uses the practical effects test it enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 1 7 to resolve dormant commerce clause questions. The general rule is: When a state statute "directly regulates or discriminates" 1 1 8 against interstate commerce, or when its direct effects are to favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests, the statute will usually be struck down without further inquiry." 19 When, however, the statute's out-of-state effects are only indirect, and it regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, the statute will generally be permitted to stand unless the burden imposed upon interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."12 0 No clear line separates the category of direct regulation, "virtually per se illegal"' 2 1 under the commerce clause, and the indirect category subject to the Pike balancing approach.' 22 In any case where an arguably legitimate local interest is present, the question becomes one of degree. In the balancing approach that follows,1 23 . For a view that the Court only resorts to "balancing" in movement-of-goods cases involving a statute enacted with a protectionist purpose, see Regan, supra note 121, at 1100 ("Once we have decided a movement-of-goods statute is not protectionist, that is the end of the matter. The statute should be upheld. There is nothing else to consider and no balancing to be done.").
Regan does not believe that the Court actually "balances" even in those cases in which it professes to. He argues that the Court should continue to avoid balancing in movement-of-goods cases. Id. at 1099. Regan noted that the Court in Brown-Forman ran together its anti-protectionism and anti-extraterritorialism considerations. He finds "no hint of balancing" in BrownForman. Id. at 1268-69. The running together of the two analyses is just what this Note argues has happened to the Pike two-tier test: in all cases, the Court will scrutinize the practical extraterritorial effects; see note 95 supra.
erations are the overall effects of the statute on both local and interstate activities.
12 4 The balancing process is a "pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers." 1 2 5
A statute directly repugnant to the commerce clause came to the Court's attention in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 126 In that case, the Court struck down an Illinois corporate takeover regulation because of its sweeping extraterritorial effect.
127 By finding it a direct affront to interstate commerce rather than an indirect regulation, the Court avoided having to concern itself with the purpose of the regulation. l2 8
Similarly, the Court found the purpose behind New York's regulation in Brown-Forman -be it promotion of temperance or promotion of intrastate competition -to be irrelevant in its analysis. Although New York's avowed goal was to prevent price discrimination among retailers, 12 9 the Court held that New York's prohibition of mid-month price changes, coupled with the regulatory agency's discretion over changes upon a showing of good cause, gave New York inappropriate power over interstate pricing.' 3 0 The statute's practical effects flew in the face of the commerce clause policy of unfettered interstate commerce.131
Continuing its assessment of the burden on interstate commerce, the Court noted that the spread of affirmation statutes since Seagram compounded the extraterritorial effects of the New York statute. The Court found that the alleged extraterritorial effects were not simply 127. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) . The regulation at issue required tender offerors pursuing statutorily defined Illinois-related targets to meet certain requirements in the interest of shareholder protection. The offeror was required to give 20 days' notice before any tender offer became effective. The regulation also required the offeror to disclose the terms of the proposed takeover. The offeror was forbidden to communicate with the target corporation's shareholders during the statutory time, although the target could disseminate information at will. Only 27% of the shareholders of the target in this litigation were residents of Illinois. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
128. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43. The Court's holding in MITE is derived primarily from older cases which later became the basis for the direct regulation prong of the Pike test. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.S. 186, 199 (1925) ("a state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens such commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted"). "matters of conjecture" as they had been in Seagram. 132 133. Brown-Forman, 106 S. Ct. at 2087. The language "subjected to inconsistent obligations in different States" is reminiscent of the "mudflap" case, a classic of movement-of-goods commerce clause jurisprudence, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Bibb, the Court struck down an Illinois statute that required a "contoured" type of rear-fender mud guard meeting certain specifications to be installed on all trucks and trailers operated on Illinois highways. The statute, enacted in the interests of safety, subjected truckers to inconsistent obligations in different states: At the Illinois border, trucking concerns were required to replace the standard mudflaps acceptable elsewhere with mudflaps meeting Illinois' specifications before proceeding. This was a potentially lengthy procedure, but it was necessary to remain in compliance with both the Illinois and the virtually universal standard mudflap specifications. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524-27. The Court, in a very straightforward opinion, balanced the state's police interest in promulgating safety regulations with the commerce clause's policy of uninhibited movement of goods. The latter won out. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 530.
Affirmation statutes are not as simple a matter as the transportation regulation at issue in Bibb. Although the situations are somewhat analogous, in that both necessitate a weighing of one state's interests with the goal of unfettered national commercial traffic, the affirmation statutes present a more invidious case. In the mudflap-type case, the statute's effect is not to prescribe conduct occurring wholly out-of-state, but simply to impose a "great burden of delay and inconvenience on those ... entering or crossing [the regulating state's] territory." Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529-30. No Illinois law in Bibb required contoured mudflaps on trucks in any other state. The question was simply one of comparing police power with free commerce. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529-30.
In affirmation cases, however, the legislature of each affirmation state is projecting its regulatory competence into other states, declaring that in order to sell in state A, distillers must set prices in all other states that are at least equal to those posted in State A. The regulatory projection becomes even more onerous in the cases of states that impose varied calculi for distillers to use in determining the "effective prices" their goods carry in each state. 38 This is demonstrated in Justice Marshall's majority opinion, which goes somewhat further than simply finding New York's statute facially burdensome on commerce. In arriving at the decision that the affirmation provision violated the commerce clause on its face, the Court moved into the second tier of the Pike test and "centered its inquiry on whether the 'practical effect' " of the law was to regulate out-of-state transactions. 139 Applying this test in the context of a concurrent statute, the Court would most likely balance the local interest (low prices for the state's consumers) against the practical out-of-state impact (a uniform national price, even if alterable at the distiller's whim). 140
C. Affirmation Statutes' Practical Out-of-State Effects Invalidate
Them Under the Commerce Clause
Because they are subject to numerous affirmation statutes, multistate producers are unable to set prices freely throughout the nation. 4 First, the affirmation network frustrates its own objects when a control state is involved. 149 If the alcohol control agency in New Hampshire, a control (state-owned distribution) state, wished to negotiate down prices charged it by a distiller, affirmation would thwart the agency's objective. The agency's attempt to secure a lower price in New Hampshire would fail despite the fact that the agency's action would be consistent with the purpose behind most affirmation statutes, the goal of lower prices for the state's consumers. 50 It might make sense economically for the agency to negotiate prices from a volume manufacturer, given the low costs of doing business inherent in the control or majority distributorship context. However, the distiller will not be likely to comply with the agency's request, since to do so would place a potentially large economic burden upon its operations elsewhere. Were the distiller to accept the lower price in New Hampshire, it would find itself in violation of other states' affirmation laws. Its action in New Hampshire would entail equivalent price reductions in every other affirmation and control state in which it does business, without regard to the commercial realities in those states. Therefore, the distiller would not be likely to assent to a lower price in New Hampshire.
In another hypothetical, this time involving both prospective and retrospective states, the statutes' burdensome effects are again apparent. Affirmation provisions make it impossible for distillers to respond to market pressures and set their prices in one state without forcing them to alter their pricing policies in other states. 15 ' Assume that a distiller sells Brand X both in New Mexico, a prospective state, 152 and in Arizona, a retrospective state 153 during January. Assume further that the distiller desires to raise the price of Brand X in New Mexico on February 1. In order to satisfy New Mexico's requirement, the distiller would also have to raise the price it charges for Brand X in Arizona on February 1, in order to insure that New Mexico's prospective statute is not violated by the sale of Brand X at a lower price in Arizona during February. By raising the price in Arizona on February 1, however, the distiller finds itself in violation of Arizona's retrospective statute because the price to be charged in Arizona in February now exceeds the price that was in effect in New Mexico during January. The only alternative open to this hypothetical distiller is to have determined in December that, in response to market conditions extant only in New Mexico, it would increase the price of Brand X across the nation on February 1. To comply with the retrospective statute in Arizona, the distiller would have had to have discontinued all sales of Brand X in Arizona (and any other retrospective state) during January. This burden -amounting to a prohibition on sales in those states -is certainly an excessive burden under the Pike! Brown-Forman line of reasoning discussed in Part III.A. 153. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-253 (Supp. 1986) (requiring affirmation that price will be at least as low as "the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold ... to any wholesaler anywhere ....
(emphasis added)).
Were the facts in this hypothetical reversed, and the exigencies of competition demanded a price increase for Brand X in a retrospective state such as Arizona, the producer would be required to cease sales of Brand X in all other states for all of January before introducing its higher price in Arizona. In short, it is an excessive burden for producers to comply with prospective and retrospective statutes simultaneously.
In a third hypothetical state of affairs in which only simultaneous statutes are involved, the specter of one-month discontinuations of sales would be eliminated. However, the statutes are still unable to pass constitutional muster because of the inconsistent treatment of distiller's posted prices and changes of those prices. 1 54 Suppose that the hypothetical distiller posts January prices of Brand X both in Minnesota, which permits mid-month price changes at will, 5 5 and in Massachusetts, which requires "good cause shown" for any schedule amendments. 56 If the producer alters the price for Brand X in Minnesota, but cannot get regulatory approval in Massachusetts for the lower price, 157 the distiller will be in violation of Massachusetts' affirmation provision since Brand X is now available more cheaply in Minnesota. To remain in compliance with Massachusetts' statute, the distiller will have to refrain until the next month from lowering its price in Minnesota unless the liquor agency in Massachusetts, exercising its statutory discretion, permits the price reduction. In this scenario, Massachusetts' statute is unconstitutional. 58 "The protections afforded by the Commerce Clause cannot be made to depend on the good grace of a state agency."' 59 Finally, consider a hypothetical involving the determination of the effective prices in each state. The varying treatments accorded promotional allowances complicate the issue yet further. If a price reduction in Minnesota, which allows any and all discounts for quantity, 160 were considered a volume discount in other states, the distiller would be forced to reduce the price posted in all of those affirmation states such as New York that restrict discounts for quantity. 6 
IV. CONCLUSION
In the twenty years since Seagram, the extraterritorial effects of liquor price affirmation statutes have ceased being "matters of conjecture."' 163 Instead, the interlocking national affirmation system causes producers of alcoholic beverages to establish a uniform national price for each item they sell without regard to local conditions. The states' imposition of significant and onerous burdens on interstate commerce through these statutes is not protected by the states' power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate liquor. The demonstrable extraterritorial effects of these statutes are sufficient to invalidate them under contemporary commerce clause jurisprudence. 
